Florida Law Review
Volume 28

Issue 1

Article 11

September 1975

Corporations: Florida Common Law Liability of Tippees in a
Shareholder's Derivative Suit
Alan Rainey

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Alan Rainey, Corporations: Florida Common Law Liability of Tippees in a Shareholder's Derivative Suit, 28
Fla. L. Rev. 223 (1975).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol28/iss1/11

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

1975]

Rainey: Corporations: Florida Common Law Liability of Tippees in a Shareh
CASE COMMENTS

CORPORATIONS: FLORIDA COMMON LAW LIABILITY OF
TIPPEES IN A SHAREHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUIT
Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975)
Chasen, the President of Lum's, Inc., tipped 2 a stockbroker that Lum's
profits would be lower than earlier public projections. The broker in turn
tipped the managers of two mutual funds, who sold their entire holdings of
4
Lum's stock 3 before public disclosure of the adverse information. Plaintiffs
6
brought a shareholders' derivative suits in New York federal district court
7
averring misuse of corporate information by the defendants in violation of a
common law duty owed to Lum's. The district court looked to Florida corporation law to determine whether there was a cause of action. 8 Although no Florida supreme court decisions on point were found, several lower court opinions
led the district court to dismiss the suit for failure to state a claim upon which
0
relief could be granted. 9 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,1
reasoning that if presented with the issues the Florida supreme court would
1. Lum's was incorporated in Florida.
2. When corporate insiders improperly disclose to outsiders information relating to corporate affairs, they are "tipping." Those who receive the information are "tippees." See Ross
v. Licht, 363 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Rapp & Loeb, Tippee Liability and Rule
lOb-5, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 55, 55 n.3.
3. The managers sold 83,000 shares for $3.50 per share more than the dosing price on
the first day of trading after the public revelation of the adverse information.
4. The SEC later successfully brought suit against Lum's and Chasen. SEC v. Lum's Inc.,
365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The trial judge found that the broker was quite close to
Chasen and that Chasen considered him an institutional advisor to Lum's. In fact, he had
asked to be informed in advance by Chasen of changes at the company so that he could
avoid embarrassment in front of his own clients for "failing to do his homework" when the
changes were disclosed to the public, Id. at 1050-57.
5. A shareholders' derivative suit is one in which a stockholder seeks to sustain in his
own name a cause of action belonging to the corporation. The corporation is the real party
in interest. See Nelson v. Miller, 212 So. 2d 66, 67 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968); Talcott v. McDowell,
148 So. 2d 36, 37 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962). See also Comment, Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 12
U. FLA. L. REv. 96 (1959). The shareholders' derivative suit should be distinguished from
the class action, in which the members of the class are the real parties in interest. See
E. BRODSKY, GUIDE TO SEcuRrrrEs LrriGATioN 135 (1974) [hereinafter cited as BRODSKY].
6. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1970). Gildenhorn
v. Lum's, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 329, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
7. Chasen and the directors of the mutual funds were dismissed as defendants for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Id. at 331, 334.
8. The district court cited Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), as
requiring it to look at New York's choice of law provisions, which in turn deferred to the
law of the state of incorporation as determinative of the existence and extent of corporate
fiduciary obligations. For an analysis of the application of choice of law principles in this
and similar fact situations, see Comment, Persons Trading on Inside Information Obtained
From a Corporate Fiduciary,87 HARv. L. Rav. 675, 685-86 (1974).
9. 355 F. Supp. at 334. See, e.g., Palma v. Zerbey, 189 So. 2d 510 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966);
Citizens' Nat'l Bank v. Peters, 175 So. 2d 54 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965); Maronek v. Atlantis
Hotel, Inc., 148 So. 2d 721 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963); Talcott v. McDowell, 148 So. 2d 36 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
10. Sub. nom. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973).
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find the New York case of Diamond v. Oreamunol persuasive and allow the
action. The United States Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit's judgment so that the controlling issues could be certified to the Florida supreme
court.' 2 On certification, the Florida court ruled that the complaint should

have been dismissed and HELD, under Florida law neither the stockbroker
who relayed the material inside information from the president of the corporation to the investors nor the investors who sold the stock on the basis of the
inside information were liable to the corporation for the investors' profits. 3
Partly because of a misconception that securities law is exclusively federal 14
and partly because state-created fiduciary duties are more limited than those
created by federal law,"5 most actions seeking recovery for insider trading are
brought under federal law. As a result, state law governing liability for disclosure of inside information is less well developed than its federal counterpart.' 6 Nevertheless, some states have acted to protect the integrity of the investment market by providing actions for various types of fraud,'7 passing
legislation forbidding deceptive practices in the issuance of new securities 8 and
imposing duties on corporate fiduciaries. Included among corporate fiduciaries'
duties is the duty to disclose certain information to persons selling company
stock to them or purchasing company stock from them. 19 Breach of this duty
11. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969).
12. Sub norm. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
13. 313 So. 2d 739, 747 (Fla. 1975).
14. There are two relevant federal securities statutes. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1970), implemented by Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5
(1975), renders it "unlawful for any person directly or indirectly . . . to engage in any act,
practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Section 16(b) of the same
act, 15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1970), provides recovery of profits realized by any officer, director, or
person who owns more than 10% of any class of any equity security through any purchase
and sale of a company security during a period of 6 months or less. The defendant's intent
is irrelevant for transactions within the 6-month period. If the company fails to sue, shareholders are specifically authorized to sue derivatively. Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act provides:
"The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any and all other
rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity ....
Nothing in this chapter shall
affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or officer performing like
functions of any state) over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the
provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder."
15. The common law duty is based on the fiduciary relationships and obligations owing
from a corporation's trusted officers and directors to the corporation and its stockholders. E.g.,
Etherege v. Barrow, 102 So. 2d 660, 662 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958). The duty owed under federal
securities law is based on the relationship and obligations owing from the corporation's
trusted officers and directors to the investing public. E.g., SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp.
1046, 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
16. See Comment, Securities Fraud: Caveat Tippee - The Creation and Development of a
Doctrine,33 U. PITT. L. REV. 79, 81 (1972); Comment, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1337, 1338 (1973).
17. E.g., Cheney v. Dickenson, 172 F. 109 (7th Cir. 1909); Logan v. Arnold, 82 Fla. 237,
89 So. 551 (1921); Beach v. Williamson, 78 Fla. 611, 83 So. 860 (1920); Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
18. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §25,000 et seq. (West Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. §517.01 et seq.
(1973); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§339-a, 352 (McKinney 1967).
19. See, e.g., Flight Equip. 3c Eng'r Corp. v, Shelton, 103 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1958); Etherege
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commonly gives the purchasing or selling investor a cause of action against the
corporate insider. The New York Court of Appeals announced a major expansion of this rule in Diamond v. Oreamuno.20
In Diamond, a shareholders' derivative suit, both the president and the
chairman of the board of a corporation were found liable to it for profits they
had reaped by trading on the basis of inside information acquired solely by
virtue of their positions. The court reasoned that the officers held the inside
information in trust for the benefit of the corporation and its shareholders. 21
As observed by the Diamond court, the common law has long recognized
that corporate officials and directors owe certain duties to the corporation because of their fiduciary positions. In 1908, the Georgia supreme court rescinded
a director's purchase of stock from company stockholders because of his failure
to disclose information that the stock's price was likely to rise.2 2 The court
reasoned that the inside information was a corporate asset 23 and, as such, was
held in trust for the stockholders' benefit. Most states, however, including
Florida, 24 do not require fiduciaries to forego all personal benefit from inside
information but follow the rule that it is the particular manner in which the
information is used that gives rise to an action for breach of fiduciary obligations. 25 In Flight Equipment & Engineering Corp. v. Shelton,26 for example, a
Florida corporation's assets exceeded its liabilities and it was about to receive
liquid assets sufficient to pay its current obligations. The president's consent to
the appointment of a receiver in bankruptcy was held to constitute a breach of
duty to the corporation, thus rendering him liable to the corporation for resultant expenses.
Fiduciary duties are owed to the corporation not only by its officers and
v. Barrow, 102 So. 2d 660 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1958). See also, Conant, Duties of Disclosure of
Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 53 (1960); Comment, Common
Law CorporateRecovery for Trading on Non-Public Information, 74 CoLuM. L. Rzv. 269, 273

n.30 (1974).
20. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969), noted in 1970 Wis. L. REv. 576.
21. The use of this trustee concept has been criticized as inappropirate since, even assuming that inside information was corporate property to be held in trust with an accounting made to the corporation for any property of the trust that was sold, no property was
sold in the instant case. Moreover, to have sold would have violated federal law. BRODSKY,
supra note 5, at 127. This criticism, however, is short-sighted since sale is not the only kind
of transaction for which a trustee is accountable. Conversion to the trustee's own use also
gives rise to an obligation to account to the trust. See J. PERRY, THE LAW OF TRusr 166, at
260 (6th ed. 1921).
22. Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903).
23. The proposition that inside information is a corporate asset, implicit in insider trading cases, has not gone unchallenged. See BRODSKY, supra note 5, at 129; Note, supra note 20,
at 579-83.
24. See, e.g., Seespedt v. Southern Laundry, Inc., 149 Fla. 402, 5 So. 2d 859 (1942); Citizens'
State Bank v. Adams, 140 Fla. 578, 193 So. 281 (1940); McGregor v. Provident Trust Co., 119
Fla. 718, 162 So. 323 (1935).
25. This "special circumstances" doctrine had its genesis in Strong v. Repids, 213 U.S. 419
(1909). See Comment, A Comparison of Insider Liability Under Diamond v. Oreamuno and

FederalSecurities Law, 11 B.C. IND. & Coii. L. REv. 499, 500-04 (1970); Comment, supra note
19, at 273 n.30.
26. 103 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1958).
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directors but also by certain other persons. For instance, the factual existence
of a relationship of trust will impose liability on an employee for breach of the
trust. In Brophy's v. Cities Service Co.,2 cited by the Diamond court, it was

observed that a mere employee does not ordinarily occupy a position of trust
and confidence. The court noted, however, that if the employee acquires secret
information relating to his employer's business in the course of his employment, he thereafter occupies a position of trust and confidence analogous in
most respects to that of a fiduciary and should act accordingly. Florida has
adopted similar reasoning.28
In reaching its decision, the Diamond court faced and summarily rejected
the argument that because there was no damage to the corporation the stockholders could not bring a derivative action. 2 9 In holding that the complaint

stated a cause of action, the court said:

[T]he primary concern, in a case such as this, is not to determine
whether the corporation has been "damaged" but to decide, as between
the corporation and the defendants, who has a higher claim to the
proceeds derived from the exploitations of the information. 30
Relying heavily on Diamond, the Second Circuit attempted in the instant

fact situation to impose common law fiduciary obligations on persons outside
the corporate organization who acquired confidental inside information. The
Second Circuit held that "co-venturers of a director who breaches his duty
should be subject to the same liabilities as the director himself." 31 Buttressing

this principle with concepts of agency law, 3 2 the court commented that "all
participants in a common enterprise must assume the same risks."33 Following
27. 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949).
28. E.g., Quinn v. Phillips, 93 Fla 805, 113 So. 419 (1927); Renpack, Inc. v. Oppenheimer,
104 So. 2d 642 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
29. See notes 55-56 infra and accompanying text.
30. 24 N.Y.2d at 497, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81, 248 N.E.2d at 913. The court did refer to damage in the sense that "the prestige and good will of a corporation, so vital to its prosperity,
may be undermined by the revelation that its chief officers have been making personal profits
out of corporate events .
" I.
id. at 498, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 82, 248 N.E.2d at 914. Rather than
"damages," the court seems to be recognizing a legal injury other than economic. It would
still remain for a plaintiff to show the extent to which the interest is infringed upon, or
"damaged."
31. 478 F.2d at 822.
32. The court relied heavily on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §312 (1958), which
provides: "A person who, without being privileged to do so, intentionally causes or assists an
agent to violate a duty to his principal is subject to liability to the principal." Comment (c)
to this section states: "A person who, with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty
to his principal, receives confidential information from the agent, may be enjoined from disclosing it and required to hold profits received by its use as a constructive trustee." See also
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, §200 comment (a) (1937): "A fiduciary is subject to a duty to
the beneficiary not to use on his own account information confidentially given by the beneficiary or acquired by him during the course of or on account of the fiduciary relation or in
violation of his duties as fiduciary, in competition with or to the injury of the beneficiary, although such information does not relate to the transaction in which he is then employed unless the information is a matter of general knowledge."
33. 478 F.2d at 823.
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the Diamond rationale, the court did not require a showing of damage to the
corporation, reasoning that the corporation's interest in its integrity should be
protected from abuse by the officers and directors themselves and any outside
34
party who trades on information disclosed by such insiders.
In rejecting the Second Circuit's analysis, the Florida supreme court added
little to the discussion of agency concepts but instead relied heavily on Judge
Kaufman's dissent from the Second Circuit's decision. Judge Kaufman opined
that the majority had "convoluted the law and facts of the case"35 in an effort
to find that the defendants were involved in a joint or common enterprise. To
be sure, the Second Circuit's rationale was not an entirely unreasonable stretch
of agency and common enterprise theory.3 6 But the refusal by the instant court
to make such an extension without evidence that the defendants actively
solicited the disclosure or concocted a prearranged scheme can be supported by
case Iaw7 and sound public policy.38 The Florida supreme court, finding what
it considered to be little more than an unsolicited and haphazard revelation of
information that was useful in making an investment decision, was not willing
to extend or even accept the Diamond decision. 9
The instant case implicitly rejects the "prophylactic" policy rationale of the
Second Circuit's holding, which was primarily based on the court's concern for
fair and honest trading on the securities markets. Such a concern arose not
only from concepts of fairness and morality but also from the court's belief that
the stock market's reputation must be beyond reproach in order for the flow
of private funds into the market to continue. It has often been contended that
a high standard of conduct on the part of management is an essential prereq-

34. Id. at 822.
35. Id. at 828.
36. Cf. Comment, supra note 19, at 282; Comment, Corporations, 87 HARv. L. REv. 675,
679 (1974); Comment, SecuritiesRegulation -Inside Information, 26 VAND. L. Riv. 1337, 1338
(1973). See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §46 at 292 (4th ed. 1971).
37. In re Carlton Crescent, 173 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1949), aff'd, 338 U.S. 304 (1949). A friend
purchased a debenture with his own funds on a director's tip during insolvency of a corporation but before the petition of bankruptcy was filed. The court said: "One who knowingly
confederates with a fiduciary in a breach of trust is not allowed to make a profit from the
transaction. But 'knowingly confederates' means more.., than investing one's own funds on a
'tip' received from an officer or director." Id. at 951.
The "conscious parallelism" antitrust cases cited as precedent in Schein are also inapposite.
In the conscious parallelism decisions, prior courses of dealing have generally been proven. Cf.
Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, 394 U.S. 700 (1969); American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306
U.S. 208 (1939).
38. See notes 46-50 infra and accompanying text.
39. The statement of the Florida court that it did not "choose to adopt the innovative
ruling of New York Court of Appeals in Diamond," 313 So. 2d at 746, is perplexing because
Florida has adopted principles of liability similar to those enunciated in Diamond. See Connelly v. Special Road & Bridge Dist. #5, 99 Fla. 456, 126 So. 794 (1930); Quinn v. Phipp, 93
Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927); Renpack, Inc. v. Oppenheimer, 104 So. 2d 642 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1958). Given these decisions and the context of the Florida court's statement, it may be that
the court meant to say that it did not choose to drop the requirement of damage to the corporation in a shareholders' derivative suit as the Diamond court had done.
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uisite to inducing private investors to purchase a firm's shares. 40 When this
sensitivity to the investment market's integrity is assumed, it becomes easy to
understand the fictions and strained logic that the Second Circuit employed to
generalize its holding; to have held otherwise, as did the Florida court, would
undoubtedly immunize certain schemes of insider trading since concocted arrangements, even if they exist, can rarely be proved. 4 1 Given what it considered
to be sound public policy and in light of the federal commitment to that
policy, the Second Circuit sought to fill in the gaps that existed within the
42
federal scheme by imposing liability in the instant fact situation.
The Florida supreme court's holding in the present case illustrates the
wide disparity of views concerning a state's role in protecting the securities
market from insider trading. Several scholars suggest that the stock market is,
in reality, an information exchange that places a market value on information. 43 Not only is insider trading viewed as a negligible problem in terms of
total transactions, 4 I but some analysts even suggest that insider trading is
beneficial because it causes stock prices to move in the correct direction. 45
Whether this is true, the fact remains that the securities market thrives on
speculation and rumor.4r To impose liability on anyone who trades on a tip,

40.

W. CARY, CORPORATIONS 715 (4th ed. 1969). See also W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION

OF INSIDER TRADING

(1968). Hetherington, Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law, 1967

Wis. L. REV. 720.
41. 478 F.2d at 823. See note 4 supra.
42. Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see note 13 supra, did not apply
in the instant situation because no purchaser met the "ten percent" requirement. Cf. Rattner
v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564, 566 (2d Cir. 1952). The limitations in the statute, strictly construed
by the courts, preclude its reaching tippees. Levy v. Seaton, 358 F. Supp. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952).
Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 did not apply to the instant situation because the plaintiffs
were not purchasers or sellers of the tainted security. See Haberman v. Murcheson, 468 F.2d
1305, 1312 (2d Cir. 1972). This purchaser-seller standing requirement, known as the "Birnbaum rule," Birnbaum v. Newport Steel, 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1951), had come under heavy
attack but was recently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Recent changes in the interpretation of Rule lOb-5 have
broadened its applicability, substantially reducing the gap-filling need for common law
recovery. E.g., Kline v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1057
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also Comment, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Management Codes, 86 HARV. L. REV., 1007, 1017 n.49 and accompanying text (1973);
Case Notes, Securities Law, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 985 (1972).
43. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING & THE STOCK MARKET, (1966). See also Wu, An Economist
Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 COLUM~. L. REV. 260 (1968).
44. H. MANNE, supra note 43.
45. Id. But see Schotlord, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425
(1967).
46. "There is continued apparent recognition that many investnent analysts believe that
inside information is the name of the game. Some view their main function as ferreting out
more information than their competitors and directing it to their customers who will trade on
it. That, they believe, is what they are being paid for." BRODSKY, supra note 5, at 105. See also
N.Y. Times, May 14, 1973, at 44.
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without more, could have a substantial "chilling effect" on the securities
7
market that could cause more harm than it would prevent.
Moreover, since the Diamond decision in 1969, judicial construction of
federal securities law has significantly altered the contextual realities that the
instant court would otherwise have faced. Recently there has been a substantial expansion of the applicability of Rule lOb-5,48 for instance, which significantly undercuts the gap-filling rationale of the Second Circuit's opinion.
To impose liability at the state level when overlapping federal remedies are
available, would open the defendants in insider trading cases to the potential
of multiple vexation and liability.
The Second Circuit confronted the problem of multiple liability by asserting that the defendants in the instant situation were "well able to protect
themselves from multiple liability" by creating, out of any relief awarded, an
escrow fund that could be used to satisfy future judgments.49 It is not clear,
however, that such a procedure would have worked in the instant situation.
For example, it would be futile for shareholders to bring a suit on behalf of
the corporation if the firm were merely acting as a conduit for the judgments
of other individual plaintiffs. Moreover, there are the problems of administration and cost and the possibility of further legal action if the corporation refused to honor a valid claim.50 Although there is no indication that these policy
considerations were a basis of the Florida court's decision, the problems presented by multiple liability are nevertheless substantially reduced by the court's
holding.
The major weakness in the instant decision is its treatment of the damage
element of the shareholders' derivative suit. Florida law recognizes a strong
presumption in favor of official corporate judgment, including a decision to
forego a cause of action belonging to the corporation.-' Deferring to representative majority control in corporate management, 2 the Florida courts have established three conditions precedent to shareholders' derivative suits: owner47. Comment, Investors Management: Institutional Investors as Tippees, 119 U. PA. L.
REv. 502, 508-10 (1971). Consider the dilemma of a securities analyst who inadvertently discovers inside information. Is his duty to the company (not to disclose) or to his customers and
clients (to disclose)? See BRODSKY, supra note 5, at 142-46. See also Comment, Conflicting
Duties of Brokerage Firms, 88 HARV. L. Rlv. 396 (1974).
Given that these conflicting duties exist under federal regulations as well, it may be that
there is little reason not to extend liability at the state level. There is, however, some thought
that the problem of conflicting duties of brokerage firms is more manageable at the federal
level. Comment, 88 HARV. L. REv. 396, 422 n.132 (1974).
48. See note 42 supra. But see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
49. 478 F.2d at 825. The court pointed to the method employed in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) af'd in part, ree'd in part, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). In that case, the court directed that any recovery
should be held in escrow "subject to disposition in such manner as the court might direct
upon application by the SEC or other interested party or on the court's own motion." Id. at
93. The assumption of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act is that recovery will be limited to
actual damages. Comment, 26 VAND. L. REv. 1337, 1345 n.63 (1973).
50. See BRODSKY, supra note 5, at 130-34.
51. Stone v. Holly Hill Fruit Prod., Inc., 56 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1932).
52.

Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [1975], Art.[Vol.
11 XXVIII

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

ship of shares in the corporation at the time the wrong was committed;5 3 the
director's unjustified refusal, on the plaintiff's demand, to bring suit in the
corporation's behalf; 54 and damage to the corporation.5 5 Thus, the instant decision suggests that, even had the Florida supreme court found the Second
Circuit's extension of agency principles persuasive, it still would have dismissed the complaint for want of damage to the corporation. 5
Although the prerequisites of standing and prior unjustified refusal by the
directors seem compelled by legal and business policy,57 the damage requirement is not justified. It does not add substantially to these policies, nor is there
any other significant reason for its being a prerequisite to a shareholders'
derivative suit. To a large extent the determination of injury to the corporation is implicit in the second requirement, that the refusal of the shareholders'
demand be unjustified. In addition, Florida law, which requires the posting of
security for expenses by shareholders in a derivative suit38 protects against
abusive and unjustified harassment of corporate officials.5 9
The instant court seems to have set an appropriate boundary for tippee
liability in state court actions; but, the prerequisites to bringing a derivative
action operate effectively to contract this ambit of liability. By standing fast on
the damage requirement, the court may have precluded shareholders' derivative suits that would have been meritorious under its conception of tippee liability. 60 The court could have carved out an exception to the damage prerequisite by permitting actions to be brought without a showing of damages
where the averred wrongful conduct was violative of the law. Such an exception is justified in that the wrongful act itself vitiates the presumption of
corporate judgment not to bring a suit in its own behalf.61

53. News-Journal Corp. v. Gore, 147 Fla. 217, 2 So. 2d 741 (1941).
54. Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 119 Fla. 159, 161 So. 284 (1935); Conlee Constr.
Co. v. Cay Constr. Co., 221 So. 2d 792 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969); Talcott v. McDowell, 148 So. 2d
36 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
55. Palma v. Zerby, 189 So. 2d 510 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966); Citizens' Nat'l Bank v. Peters,
175 So. 2d 54 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 196.5); Maranek v. Atlantis Hotel, Inc., 148 So. 2d 721 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1963); Talcott v. McDowell, 148 So. 2d 36 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
56. 313 So. 2d at 746.
57. Compare cases cited note 52 supra with H. HENN, LAw OF CORPORATIONS §359, at 752
(1970) (prevention of strike suits by disgruntled shareholders).
58. FLA. STAT. §608.131 (1973). Cf. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Peters, 175 So. 2d 54 (2d D.C.A.
Fla. 1965). But see Comment, Security for Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits, 4 COL.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 50 (1968).
59. 175 So. 2d at 57 (the determination as to the furnishing of security is not a determination as to the sufficiency of the complaint to state a cause of action).
60. See BRODSKY, supra note 5, at 126. "We wonder whether or not the corporation was
There is considerable doubt as to whether . . . the corporation is dam'injured' at all ....
aged in the traditional sense." Quaere whether a cause of action against Chasen could have
been brought even if jurisdiction had existed? See also Wildes v. Rural Homestead Co., 53
N.J. Eq. 452, 32 A. 676 (Ch. Ct. 1895).
61. Cf. Crandell-Kath Lumber Co. v. Progressive Prod. Inc., 173 Minn. 112, 217 N.W. 142
(1927); Gipson v. Bedard, 173 Minn. 104, 217 N.W. 139 (1927). See also Orlando Orange Grove
Co. v. Hale, 107 Fla. 304, 144 So. 674, 676 (1932). Quaere whether a damage prerequisite is
appropriate in suits to recover illegal corporate campaign contributions?
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